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ABSTRACT 
 
T. JESSE DENT, JR.: Higher Education Reform in Post-Soviet Russia 
(Under the direction of Dr. Graeme Robertson) 
 
 
 One of the critical tasks of post-Soviet Russia is the transformation of its 
education system. Focusing on higher education, I analyze recent higher education 
reform efforts in three broad periods. I begin with the Soviet legacy bequeathed by the 
seven decades of GOSPLAN/Party dominance, and then discuss the perestroika 
reforms that ended abruptly with the breakup of the Soviet Union. Second, I discuss 
the reform effort during the Yeltsin years. The new environment coupled with a 
default policy of decentralization and educational autonomy resulted in a laissez-faire 
period that produced a number of challenges and negative consequences for higher 
education. Third, I discuss Putin’s approach to higher education reform in the second 
decade of post-Soviet Russia. I argue that Putin pursued a directed development 
approach where central authorities implemented regulatory and fiscal policy with the 
aim of realizing Putin’s vision of a tiered system of higher education institutions in 
Russia. Next, I present a discussion of contemporary Russians’ perspectives on higher 
education gleaned from recent surveys. I conclude that for the near future, leaders in 
post-Soviet Russia will continue to utilize tools and approaches similar to their Soviet 
predecessors—e.g., five year plans—and Russian society will continue to acquiesce in 
the plan. 
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I 
INTRODUCTION
 
 
 With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian 
Federation as its heir, post-Soviet Russia commenced an era of sweeping political, 
economic, and social change. Unfortunately, the first decade of post-Soviet Russia was 
a period of upheaval and crises. Indeed, Russia in the 1990s is often described as a 
“frontier-style” society because of the chaos and ruthlessness accompanying the 
haphazard and painful approach to privatization and the creation of a market 
economy. Also, the value or goal of equity and equality appeared abandoned and 
individual needs and rights were neglected. Consequently, there was wide 
dissatisfaction with all aspects of society and increasing calls for change. Ironically, 
leaders in post-Soviet Russia have attempted to bring about change in much the same 
way as their Soviet predecessors: They too have attempted to implement programs of 
political and economic change as “revolution from above,” with little or no base of 
support for their own variety of five-year plans.    
 The purpose of this paper is to analyze higher education reform in post-Soviet 
Russia. As emphasized in World Bank studies, developing the tertiary education sector 
is an important task in all societies as it is a critical pillar of human development. 
Higher education faces unprecedented challenges in the 21st Century arising from the 
impact of globalization, the increasing importance of knowledge as a principal driver of 
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growth, and the information and communication revolution (World Bank 2002). These 
challenges confront and require a response from all societies, including well developed 
societies such as the OECD countries. Transition societies such as Russia are 
confronted with an additional task: They must address a number of unresolved issues 
in their higher education systems—i.e., devising sustainable plans for expanding higher 
education, reducing inequality in access and outcome, improving the quality and 
relevance of higher education, and devising an implementing new and flexible 
governance structures and management practices (World Bank 2002, 1-2). How and 
how well have these kinds of unresolved issues been addressed in post-Soviet Russia is 
the focus of this paper. 
 I discern three distinct periods in Russia’s recent experience in higher education 
reform. I begin with what I call the Soviet period and discuss the Soviet legacy in higher 
education, and analyze the short-lived higher education reform program under 
perestroika during the second half of the 1980s. Second, I discuss the reform 
experience in the 1990s, the Yeltsin years. I call this the laissez-faire period. By default, 
President Yeltsin pursued a policy of decentralization and autonomy for higher 
education institutions, essentially reducing the role of the state, especially in the 
funding of higher education. This represented a radical change in the environment of 
higher education and, as a result, reform was unable to achieve any real traction in the 
1990s. Third, I discuss reform during the Putin years in the second decade of post-
Soviet Russia. I call this the period of directed development as President Putin was 
more willing to use state power to control the development of higher education: He 
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implemented policies and funding mechanisms designed to develop his vision of a 
tiered system of HEIs. Next, I discuss public perspectives on Russian higher education 
after nearly two decades of post-Soviet experience and draw some conclusions.
 
 
II 
THE SOVIET PERIOD
 
 For this discussion, the Soviet period includes the entire communist era. 
Although there were different leaders with their various agendas and programs, 
certain characteristic perspectives, beliefs, and practices transcended them all to 
produce a distinctive Soviet legacy. This chapter has two tasks. First, I discuss the 
Soviet legacy, outlining the characteristic features of the Soviet education system 
resulting from seven decades of communist rule. The consequence of deficiencies and 
inefficiencies in Soviet education policy was a bulky and outmoded higher education 
system with a dilapidated resource base and decaying infrastructure. Second, I outline 
and discuss the short-lived reforms under perestroika during the Gorbachev years, 
analyzing the goals and themes of the reforms. I conclude that although the Soviet 
education system was widely perceived as irreparably flawed, certain ideals such as 
equity, equality, free education and employment guarantees gained some currency 
among the Russian people, and persist even in the post-Soviet Russia.  
The Soviet Legacy 
 
 Discipline and uniformity formed the cornerstone of Soviet education 
philosophy. In the higher education experience Soviet style, teaching involved 
instructors and professors passing along prepackaged material, and learning involved 
students’ memorizing that material. Education was an important control mechanism 
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with close ties to the state and party. The goal of education was to fix students’ 
personality to fit the needs of the economy rather than addressing the needs of 
individuals. Consequently, Soviet education performed a dual function. On the one 
hand, the system was supposed to produce good Soviet workers; this function is 
largely responsible for the proliferation of the highly specialized technical institutes in 
the system. On the other hand, the education system was supposed to enhance the 
Party’s ideologies and influence in society; this function is partly responsible for the 
problem of boredom and low morale, and questions about the relevance of Russian 
education (Jones 1994, 3-4).  
 Centralization was the modus operandi of the Soviet system. Management of 
higher education institutions (HEIs) and education programs was high centralized. All 
institutions were state institutions and were funded solely by the state. While higher 
education was free for students who gained admission to an HEI, students had no say 
in what program they would pursue. The curriculum for the specific specialist tracks—
nearly five hundred—and the number of specialists needed in the economy each year 
were all centrally planned. HEIs and local and regional authorities had little latitude of 
decision. Consequently, the system turned out inadequate number of specialists, often 
poorly and inappropriately trained. This contributed to chronic regional and sectorial 
labor shortages in the Soviet Union.  
In addition, the Soviet system created a highly complex administrative 
structure in higher education. There was a plethora of levels and types of institution 
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whose boundaries were blurred. Even today university level education is grouped with 
four other levels of tertiary institutions under a category called professional education: 
Vocational education (nachalnoe professionalnoe obrazovanie);  
Non-university level higher education (srednee professionalnoe obrazovanie);  
University level higher education (vysshee professionalnoe obrazovanie);  
Doctoral study programs (aspirantura and doctorantura);  
Upgrading, retraining and LLL (poslevuzovskoe professionalnoe obrazovanie). 
 
There remain serious questions about the interface of the various levels and types of 
HEIs, as well as the interface between higher education, other parts of the education 
system, and business and industry in the economy. To further complicate the system, 
over two dozen agencies in the central government were responsible for supervising 
HEIs, and the various ministries in the central government could establish their own 
institutes and universities (Jones 1994, 4-5).  
Unfortunately, the most glaring feature of the Soviet legacy in education was 
the dilapidated and decayed physical infrastructure and material base of HEIs. The vast 
majority of students and staff lived and worked in squalor conditions. Professors 
struggled to subsist on or augment meager salaries, while students had to find ways to 
survive on or supplement meager stipends. The higher education experience levied a 
heavy tax on the physical and emotional well-being of students and staff.  
The Perestroika Reforms 
 
Despite the chronic deficiencies of the system and the proclivity for labor 
shortages, Soviet reform efforts approximated the shuffling and reshuffling of a worn 
out deck of cards. As Stephen Kerr observed, reform in the USSR from the 1940s up to 
the Gorbachev era mostly involved tinkering with the balance between vocational and 
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academic tracks in Russian education. Glasnost and perestroika, however, promised 
the opportunity for genuine change with the Gorbachev reforms of 1986-87. 
Gorbachev’s goal was to improve the inefficient system of training, assigning, and 
updating workers. The underlying theory was that improving Soviet education would 
better serve the economy. The two principal goals of the reforms were first, ending 
the regional shortages in key industries, and second, accelerating the introduction of 
technology into the workplace through education-industry collaboration (Kerr 1992, 
147-148). Kerr discerned three broad themes in the 1986-87 reforms: (1) forging new 
collaborative partnerships between science and higher education and modern 
industries and employers; (2) improving and updating the form, content and process of 
higher education; and (3) improving the organization and administration of higher 
education. 
The first theme envisioned long-term collaboration in research and 
development activities through “scientific-instructional-production combines.” The 
idea was to change the relationship among higher education, planning agencies and 
the industrial sector that would transform the training of specialist to ensure they 
acquired up-to-date and relevant skills.  Government would provide some funding for 
the new schemes but firms and factories would provide funding as well. The 
collaborations were conceived as mutually beneficial to higher education and industry. 
Employers would have more input in the preparation of specialists, along with 
opportunities for incumbent employees to update their skills in continuing education 
and life-long learning programs developed by HEIs. HEIs would have the opportunity to 
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participate in research and development activities that will upgrade their knowledge of 
modern industrial needs. In addition, professional staff would engage in innovative 
activities gaining knowledge and experience with new technology and techniques what 
would enhance their instructional roles in the university (Kerr 1992, 147-148). 
Unfortunately, the collaborations did not develop as predicted. At least three major 
factors militated against significant collaboration between higher education and 
industry. First, there were few incentives for industry to embrace the plan and to 
participate. Although there was much talk about changes in Soviet economy and 
society, most industries remained monopolies that were centrally controlled by their 
ministries. Well positioned decision makers at all levels tended to be conservers, 
safeguarding their standing and influence by supporting the status quo rather than 
embracing experimentation, innovation and change.  Second, the reforms were based 
on faulty assumptions about the capabilities of Soviet HEIs. Perhaps barely five percent 
of HEIs had the research personnel, experience, and resource base to contribute to 
economic develop activities and to carry-on up-grading and continuing education 
programs. Indeed, most HEIs barely had the personnel and resources to carry-on their 
regular instructional activities. Third, attitudes about change curtailed progress. 
Although the old system had its problems, people understood the system and were 
very tentative about embracing new and unknown alternatives, and the potential 
threats inherent in new alternatives (Kerr 1992, 150-151). 
The focus of the second theme—changing and upgrading the form, content and 
process of higher education—revealed some stark realities of the system. First and 
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foremost, there was the very poor preparation of Russian students for higher 
education on the input end, and the over-crowded fields of poorly prepared specialists 
on the output end (Kerr 1992, 152-153). Second, there were the deplorable living 
conditions of students. Most students had no alternative to over-crowded, dilapidated, 
unsanitary and rodent-infested student hostels, often located some distance from 
their universities in high crime areas. Student life was further frustrated by the lack of 
the basic goods for a minimum level and standard of living, e.g., personal hygiene 
products and staple food supplies.  Third, work environment for students, faculty and 
staff was thoroughly depleted of any significant aesthetic or material stimuli to bolster 
teaching and learning (Kerr 1992, 154-155). Consequently, the experience was quite 
dismal for most in many HEIs, morale was low and the relationship between students, 
faculty and staff was strained.  
The 1986-87 reforms were to address the issue of poor preparation of 
incoming students by raising and enforcing new standards for admission. While this 
measure would surely promote the admission of more high achievers from secondary 
school, there were inadvertent consequences. The raising of entrance standard 
promised to reduce the number of entrants from rural areas and from the families of 
farmers and workers (Kerr 1992, 152-153). Usually, only the well-positioned and well-
to-do families in urban areas had knowledge of and access to the resources that could 
bolster their children’s chances of winning positions in their preferred institutions. 
Overall, progress in the goal of changing and improving the form, content and 
process of higher education was constrained by two factors, traditionalism and 
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scarcity. As Kerr points out in his analysis, traditionalism was pervasive in higher 
education. Any innovation had to overcome resistance from administrators, 
Komsomol, trade unions, and legal officials (Kerr 1992, 153). Further complicating 
matters was the potential for resistance and conflicting requirements and regulations 
from the plethora of central and regional agencies and officials managing HEIs.  Kerr 
illustrates this point by highlighting how the effort to reduce and redefine the nearly 
500 specialist concentrations to around 300 was impeded by staff in HEIs and the 
ministries who understood the old system and who perceived themselves as vested in 
the status quo. The scarcity of time and resources further constrained progress. The 
heavy teaching loads of faculty—equivalent to 9-11 courses per semester—left little 
time for redefining specialties and writing new curricula (Kerr 1992, 154). What is 
more, most professors had to pursue outside work to supplement their meager 
salaries (about 238 rubles per month). Most took part-time and adjunct positions in 
other institutions. Further, when time did permit, few HEIs had the resource base to 
redefine and redesign specialties. For seven decades the country was essentially 
disengaged from the international scientific and academic community, the global 
economic system and the international division of labor. The scarcity of working 
computers and Internet access further inhibited Soviet and later Russian re-
engagement and connection with the larger world (Kerr 1992, 154-155). Indeed, this 
scarcity inhibited connectivity and collaboration among Russian institutions 
themselves. 
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The third theme of improving the organization and administration of higher 
education called for eliminating the highly complex and crisscrossing maze of 
bureaucratic regulation and control. Ironically, the idea was to centralize coordination 
and control of general policies in a single entity, effectively ending the control of 
several individual ministries. Progress in this effort continues to stall as multiple 
ministries remain the founder of multiple HEIs and are unlikely to relinquish authority 
over them voluntarily. A recent OECD study reveals the numbers. 
Russian HEIs are supervised by 24 federal executive agencies. The largest 
founders of state HEIs are: the Ministry of Education and Science (337 
institutions), the Ministry of Agriculture (58 institutions), the Ministry of Health 
and Social Development (47 institutions) and the Ministry of Culture and Mass 
Communication (44 institutions). Eight more ministries and agencies have at 
most two universities under their control. (OECD 2007, 37) 
 
Not only has the administrative and supervisory structure remained largely 
unchanged, the web of officials and agencies often issued confusing and conflicting 
directives. The savvy officials at HEIs learned to cope with and respond to intrusive 
directives even when nothing was or could be done. They would respond as follows: 
“Measures have been taken.” “The change has been made.” “The change has been 
noted.” Successful officials in the HEIs learned to play the game (Kerr 1992. 155-156). 
The reforms also called for the election of rectors and improved evaluation of 
academic staff, administrators and institutions at all levels. Again, progress was slow. 
In 1988, 139 of 898 rectors had been elected. Of the approximately 400,000 staff of 
HEIs less than 2 percent had been evaluated. On the surface, it would appear that the 
HEI community would welcome more local autonomy and control. However, feelings 
were mixed at best. With local autonomy came the possibility of the return of the old 
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“Soviet bosses” phenomenon as rectors could monopolize power and abuse those new 
powers. Further, HEIs were apprehensive about the attending conflict that would 
accompany the power to resolve tough issues surrounding the allocation of internal 
resources, setting research and program priorities, and deciding the number and types 
of students served (Kerr 1992, 154-156). 
 In Kerr’s assessment—as well as my own assessment—the 1986-87 higher 
education reforms, like previous Soviet era reforms, changed little. Indeed, according 
to Kerr, Gorbachev’s reforms were characteristically Soviet, i.e., the reforms were a 
centrally developed plan; the plan was conservative in form and substance; popular 
inspection was illusionary; the design called for small adjustments to established 
structures and practices (Kerr 1992, 160). In the end, however, rapid changes in other 
parts of the society abruptly ended the Soviet Union and radically alter the 
environment of higher education. But while the USSR came to an end, the Soviet 
legacy would continue to manifest itself in the first decades of the post-Soviet Russia.
 
 
III 
 
THE LAISSEZ FAIRE PERIOD: HIGHER EDUCATION DURING THE YELTSIN YEARS
 
 The first period of post-Soviet reforms corresponds with the Yeltsin years, 
1992-1999. The impending social and economic transformations of Russian society 
produced upheaval crises that presented both opportunities and challenges for higher 
education. In this chapter, I begin with a discussion of the new environment of higher 
education due the transformation of Russian society. Next, I discuss higher education 
reform in the 1990s, focusing on the shifting philosophy and goals of Russian higher 
education, the changing reform agenda, and difficulties in conceiving and 
implementing change. I end the chapter with some observations and conclusions 
about continuity and change in the 1990s. 
The New Environment of Higher Education 
 
 As everyone observes, the most radical change of the environment of higher 
education was the breakup of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. The establishment 
of the Russian Federation led by Yeltsin promised a more decentralized system and 
government based on democratic principles, and a market economy. In many ways, 
the 1990s were the best of times and the worst of times. 
 It was the best of times because of the impending transformation and the 
promise of new opportunities and a better life. The new Russian society would have a 
new base of support consisting of a new class of property owners, business people, 
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and large private fortunes in a liberal capitalist system. To achieve this, Yeltsin initiated 
a program to eliminate state-owned industries, to privatize the entire economic 
infrastructure, and to privatize most real estate including housing. Russia would also 
be reintegrated into the global economic system. Not only was it believed that this 
program would be implemented successfully, it would be generously financed by 
credits and loans from Western banks, governments, and international financial 
institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund (Medvedev 2000, 4-5).   
 It was the worst of times because the transformation created upheaval and 
cause great human misery. Relying heavily on advice and input from a few Western 
advisers, Yeltsin’s shock therapy produced dire consequences for the vast majority of 
the Russian population. Thousands of Russians depositors were robbed of their savings 
by unscrupulous commercial banking practices and pyramid schemes. Those 
accounts—averaging around 1,600 rubles belonging to mostly older Russians—were 
an important source future private investment in Russia. Savings not lost in the 
banking system were devoured by high prices. The presidential decree of January 2, 
1992 on price liberalization inflicted great misery (Medvedev, 28-30). While the end of 
shortages in consumer goods can be boasted early on in post-Soviet Russia, few people 
could manage the high and rising prices of goods and services. Likewise, privatization 
was not the panacea it was expected to be. While the transfer of apartments and 
dachas to their dwellers made many Russians happy homeowner owners for the first 
time, whispers and rumors about citizens being murdered and swindled out of their 
property by neighbors and friends abound. What is more, Russia won the reputation of 
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presiding over the biggest transfer of—or theft of—state property in world history 
(Medvedev, 87). Critics observe that Yeltsin’s presidential decrees and Anatoly 
Chubais’s tenure at the State Committee for the Management of State Property 
resulted in the transfer of valuable property and industries at bargain basement prices 
to a small group of tax-evading interests who became part of the infamous oligarchs. 
 Comparing post-Soviet Russia’s reform efforts with those of past Soviet 
governments, Roy Medvedev points to the use of five-year plans as the paradigm 
approach to development in the communist era since 1928. He argues that the most 
successful five-year plan was the eight plan from 1966-1970 (Khrushchev years), and 
the least successful was the twelfth, 1986-1990 (Gorbachev years). Conceptualizing the 
first years of post-Soviet Russia as a thirteenth five-year plan, Medvedev asserts 
 
But when it came to the ‘thirteenth five-year plan, that is, the 1991-1995 
period, to call it merely ‘unsuccessful’ would be a mockery. Appraising the 
results of those years, the authors of sober economic studies, not given to 
hyperbole, used words like ‘crash’ or ‘catastrophe.’ (Medvedev 2000, 138-139) 
 
It was unfortunate, then, that social and economic upheaval and crisis formed the 
backdrop for higher education reform in the first decade of post-Soviet Russia. 
Higher Education Reform in the 1990s 
 
 The key elements of a new conception of Russian higher education include 
increased institutional autonomy, de-politicized curricula, emphasis on democratic 
principles in university life and governance, new emphasis on the humanities, and the 
creation of a humanistic environment for teaching and learning. Harvey Blazer points 
out that during the early years of post-Soviet Russia reformers emphasized the 
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humanistic and personality focus of higher education reform. In defense of their 
position they cite several negative consequences that might prevail if Russian higher 
education did not change. First, democratic development might be impeded due to 
inadequate legal, economic, and political education. Second, the old system of training 
would render graduates defenseless in a market economic system and trigger a serious 
crisis among young people. Third, the old system would continue to weaken Russia’s 
ability to compete in the global economy. Fourth, Russians might lose connection to 
their rich humanitarian culture if the old system were not reformed. (Blazer 1994, 31) 
Recognition of these and other consequences should have provided a strong impetus 
for reform.  
 The major instruments utilized to realize this new conception of higher 
education include presidential decrees, the 1992 draft law on education, and the 1996 
Law on Higher Education and Postgraduate Education. 
 There were two groups of provisions in the 1996 Law. The first group focused 
on the principles that should guide state policy in higher education. Chief among these 
were the sovereign right of citizens to make decisions about their own needs and goals 
in higher and professional education, and the guarantee of higher education free of 
charge on a competitive basis. The law also charge government with the task of 
integrating Russian higher education into the world higher education system while 
preserving and developing Russian achievements and traditions. Further, government 
policy should guarantee transparency throughout the system, provide state assurances 
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regarding the financing of HEIs, and promote and ensure wider access to higher 
education (OECD 1999, 10-11).  
 The second group of provisions focused on the actual changes desired in the 
higher education system—i.e., in the management and governance of the system, in 
the relationship between higher education and society, and in the HEIs themselves. To 
improve the overall system, they proposed to define the structure of the system and 
clarify the levels and time periods of study, and establish national standards. For the 
HEIs, they wanted to better define the titles of HEIs and strengthen institutional 
autonomy. To improve the management and governance of higher education they 
proposed to strengthen the legal basis for the management of HEIs and elaborate the 
legal basis for quality control, financing, and ownership of property. To strengthen the 
relationship between higher education and society, they desired to clarify the roles 
interrelationship between federal, regional, and local authorities, HEIs, the economy, 
and citizens of the Russian Federation. I would argue that such long lists of principles 
and plans included in reform legislation and decrees are just platitudes that seldom 
lead to significant change, unfortunately.  
 However, Blazer asserts that several initiatives during the early years of 1990s 
stand out as a real departure from Soviet practices. One example was the plan for 
education administration. Reformers proposed a decentralized administration with 
authority vested in local, regional and republic bodies. Decision making and regulation 
would be decentralized and UNESCO international standards for reporting and 
evaluating universities would be introduced (Blazer 1994, 32). Another example was 
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the proposal to reorganize Russian higher education system to consist of four levels—
level one, incomplete higher education, 2 years study/training; level 2, basic higher 
education, 2 years beyond level 1; level 3, complete or specialized higher education, 
no less than 2 years beyond level 2; and level 4, graduate study leading to degree of 
kandidat, three years beyond complete or specialized higher education.  The new 
multilevel system was enacted in 1992 as a voluntary system that would exist 
alongside the old system.  HEIs were given the discretion to decide for themselves 
whether to adopt the new system in whole or in part (Blazer, 33-34). I think Balzer 
appropriately describes the introduction of this voluntary system as an “invitation to 
chaos” in Russian higher education. 
  Theodore P. Gerber also points to several key changes in the 1990s that he 
considers important. One change was the relaxation or end of government restrictions 
on new enrollments in each institution or specialization. Another was the rapid rise of 
newly permitted private institutions of higher education. Also, substantial cuts in state 
funding of higher education meant much smaller budgets, forcing HEIs to develop 
other means of funding. Consequently, state institutions began charging tuition and 
fees, signaling a substantial rise in the cost of education for Russians. Further, there 
was some relaxation of controls over admission procedures.  These final two changes 
raise concern for Gerber. He asserts that “the decentralization of admissions 
procedures and the increased cost of postsecondary schooling could increase origins-
based inequalities in access if students from advantaged origins can more readily 
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adapt to the changing admissions criteria at the local level and afford the increased 
costs,” compared to students from disadvantaged origins (Gerber 2007, 299-300).  
I would add that decentralization and relaxation of controls provided 
opportunities for other negative consequences, as well. In the 1990s, the unrestrained 
growth of institutions claiming higher education status compounded the problems of 
an already problematic higher education system. In 1992, commercial universities 
were legalized and shortly after that, state HEIs were allowed to admit commercial 
student, i.e., fee-paying students.  As officials at state universities observed the 
commercial institutions making money, they embarked on strategies to increase the 
number of fee-paying students at their own institutions.  Consequently, the system 
was overrun with around 3,000 institutions, including existing HEIs and their various 
branches, new commercial HEIs and their branches, and new institutions of 
questionable capability and quality.    
While the nature and result of Russian transition during the 1990s will be 
debated for years to come, it is quite clear that the environment of higher education 
had radically changed. Two examples illustrate this point. First and foremost is the 
changing role of the state. I would argue that with the abrupt formal end of the 
Gosplan/Party system of centralized regulation and control, HEIs were thrust into a 
kind of limbo as the new system had to be more fully articulated. What is more, the 
new system depended on the active participation of HEIs and their leaders to take on 
more responsibilities and leadership in the implementation process. Participation was 
slow in coming, however. Although recurrent social and economic depression and 
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crisis during the period inhibited participation, I would argue that the reluctance to act 
and take on responsibility for bringing about change was the result of the remnants of 
the culture of the old system. I think an OECD study states this best 
 
. . . the Russian Federation’s fundamental capacity to provide policy leadership 
for the nation and to uphold basic assurances regarding equity and quality 
across the diversity and complexity of the tertiary education system is 
increasingly in question. The capacity of (federal authorities) to pursue a 
constructive agenda is being undermined by several strong forces. These 
include the deepening centrifugal force of regional power, the tendency of 
rectors and university leaders to use their autonomy to pursue their own 
courses and to resist policy direction, and the federal government’s weak 
financial leverage. As a result, the (country) is in a dangerous hiatus between 
outdated policies that block change, and unrealized polices that are need to 
guide, stimulate and facilitate change. In a time when rapid adjustment is 
critical to survival, the tertiary education system is drifting . . . unable to act 
(OECD 1999, 13-14). 
 
The second example that illustrates the point that the environment of higher 
education had radically changed was the changing pattern of employment and labor 
demands. Jobs in production declined sharply forcing millions to search for other 
forms of employment. Fortunately, the service sector was growing rapidly and was 
poised to hire millions of workers who were demanding training and credentials in 
new fields, e.g., banking, business, insurance, legal services, etc. In the early years of 
post-Soviet Russia, HEIs had a dearth of resources and experience to cope with this 
change.
 
 
IV 
 
DIRECTED DEVELOPMENT: THE PUTIN YEARS
 
 
 The second period of higher education reform in post-Soviet Russia 
corresponds with the Putin years, 2000-2008. During this period, the state was much 
more vigilant and poised to regulate higher education. In addition to the prevalence of 
the state in every aspect of society, several other trends characterized the period that 
produced negative consequences for higher education. In this chapter I begin with a 
discussion of those trends and Russian observers’ assessment of the conditions and 
status of higher education in the second decade of post-Soviet Russia. Next, I argue 
that President Putin’s approach to reform is best described as directed development 
and discuss how he portended to utilize state policy and funding in a project to 
establish a tiered system of higher education in Russia. Next, I discuss Russia’s 
participation in the Bologna Process and the issue of reintegrating Russia in the global 
system. I end the chapter with some observations and conclusion about the direction 
of Russian higher education in the coming decades. 
The Status of Higher Education by 2000 
 
 As stated above, Putin’s presidency marked the beginning of a period of 
increasing state regulation of political, economic and social life in Russia. During that 
time, several trends in higher education produced negative consequences that created 
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a very strong impetus for reform. First, the chronic shortage of financial resources in 
higher education promoted a form of entrepreneurism among HEIs characterized by 
an obsession with making money.  Administrators, professors, staff, and students alike 
were preoccupied with making money. Consequently, many questionable enterprises 
and practices pervaded society and HEIs. Second, there was a sharp increase in the 
student demand for higher education alongside a sharp decline in the quality of 
education in both the state and private sector. This presented opportunities for 
questionable programs and institutions to appear to take advantage of those willing to 
pay for desired credentials. Third, there was an unfortunate decline in the status of the 
higher education profession in society.  Decades of low pay (and sometimes no pay), 
heavy workloads and poor working conditions, tensions between instructors and 
students, along with the lack of equipment and information resources, all combined to 
tarnished the profession in the eyes of society. Consequently, with few young aspiring 
scholars and researchers, the higher education profession was aging and out-of-date. 
Fourth, Russian higher education was losing its polytechnic traditions. I would argue 
that two factors contributed to this unfortunate trend. One factor was that the chronic 
lack of funding in higher education had a crippling effect on the polytechnics. Lack of 
funds prevented the updating of technology, equipment, training, and informational 
resources. Indeed, the lack of working computers in HEIs and the modest allotments of 
time on those computers—e.g., forty-hour goal for the academic year—is an 
embarrassment by any standard. A second factor was the rise of the humanities, social 
sciences, especially economics, and business professions. Student and parent demand 
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was high and they were willing to pay for the credentials that would help them land 
good jobs in the new economy. HEIs competed for students and their funds.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 What, then, were the consequences of all these trends and what should be 
done to reform higher education in Russia?  In her 2001 article titled “What Is to Be 
Done with Higher Education?” Professor I. Bestuzhev-Lada, an academician in the 
Russian Academy of Education, lists several problems in higher education. First, there 
was a mismatch between training and employment. Bestuzhev-Lada points out that 
Russian HEIs were not producing the skill sets demanded by the modern economy and 
that the system produced too many degree holders who were poorly qualified.  
Second, there was the potential for bribery and corruption as student and parent 
demand for higher education, coupled with institutions’ scramble for funds made 
paying for admission and passing examinations a tempting option. Third, there was the 
proliferation of bogus institutions in response to increased demand and the relaxing of 
state controls. Fourth, student stipends were not adequate to support students; 
consequently, much of the students’ time involved providing for their subsistence, 
rather than concentrating on their studies. In addition, there was widespread 
demoralization in higher education. Faculty and staff were demoralized by low salaries, 
inadequate resources and facilities, and dictatorial management styles of supervisors 
and administrators. Students were demoralized by the litany of irrelevant courses, 
lectures and brutal examinations, along with the daily struggle for subsistence 
(Bestuzhev-Lada 2001, 28-29).     
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 In 2009, Professors Salnikov and Burukhin , rector and vice rector of Obninsk 
State Technical University of Nuclear Power Engineering in the Kaluga region, describe 
what they perceive to be the major pressing problems in Russian higher education, 
echoing what have become perennial concerns in the post-Soviet Russia.  They begin 
by observing the consequences of the uncontrolled growth of HEIs that began in the 
1990s and the country’s mounting demographic problems, i.e., a shrinking and aging 
population and an increasingly amoral and demoralized youth. One such consequence 
is the existence of non-viable HEIs that do not have the material-technical base 
required for the education process—libraries, labs, equipment instructors and 
instructional support staff.  The proliferation of HEIs, new ones and branches of 
existing ones, has not been accompanied by the growth of higher education 
professionals—professors, instructors and research professionals. Indeed, the higher 
education professional community is aging and preoccupied with outside jobs and 
interests in their efforts to augment modest university pay and to find better work and 
conditions (Salnikov and Burukhin, 73).   Further, Salnikov and Burukhin are concerned 
about the transformation of Russian higher education into mass higher education 
focused on making money rather than intellectual achievement. They cite as evidence 
the growth in the number of students attending state-run universities on a contract 
basis, and the substitution of formal interviews for admission examinations (Salnikov 
and Burukhin, 75).  Still further, they point out a serious discontinuity in the Russian 
education system. They argue that one of the most serious problems affecting the 
activities of HEIs is that of preparing secondary school students to enroll in HEIs. Not 
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only is the population of secondary school graduates shrinking, the characteristics of 
that population indicate that new students are less prepared and less willing to do the 
work necessary for adapting to and succeeding in university level studies (Salnikov and 
Burukhin 2009, 83-87). 
Putin’s Assessment and Approach  
 
 In his keynote address at the 2002 Congress of Russian University and College 
Rectors, President Putin acknowledged the benefits of maintaining the best traditions 
and classical standards of the Russian education system (although he did not specify 
those traditions and standards) At the same time, he warned against sticking to some 
outmoded notions about education. He expressed special concern over dogmas and 
conservatism in education, and the prevalence of obsolete training received in Russian 
institutions. To illustrate his point, Putin pointed to the large number of college 
graduates in Russia, yet Russian companies had to invite cadres from abroad to meet 
their needs. Likewise, government organizations had a huge shortage of well-trained 
professionals. This was an indication that higher education in Russia was not keeping 
pace with changes in the national economy and major trends in the world economy 
(Itar-Tass 2002).      
 While a number of innovations and changes called for in Russian higher 
education may be attributed to Putin’s government, I would argue that the important 
point is to understand the themes that constitute the “yardstick” Putin uses to assess 
the effectiveness of reforms—quality, accessibility, and relevance. All three themes 
were clearly addressed in Putin’s 2004 state of the nation address. He acknowledged 
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the recent and rapid expansion of higher education in Russia and the world but decried 
the attendant lowering of teaching standards and quality.  Regarding the issue of 
accessibility, Putin expressed concern that inadequate student stipends and the 
declining number of student hostels would render high quality education inaccessible 
to children from low income families in remote towns and villages. With regards to 
relevance, again Putin stressed the problem of the relationship between .training and 
the economy, observing that over half the graduates of higher education institutions 
could not find employment in their specialties. Putin urged closer collaboration 
between national business interests and higher education, and the introduction of 
educational standards appropriate for the contemporary national economy and the 
global economy (Itar-Tass 2004). 
 In his efforts to develop Russian higher education in accordance with the 
principles of quality, accessibility, and relevance, Putin has introduced a number of 
controversial reforms. One such controversial initiative is the unified state examination 
(USE).  The USE is a standardized exam designed to do two things—attest to the basic 
knowledge and skills of school leavers, and attest to the readiness of students to 
pursue university level studies. Officials introduced the USE on an experimental basis 
with the intention of fine-tuning the test in preparation for universal implementation 
in the future. For Putin and other government officials, the USE would make an 
important contribution to realizing the three values they wanted to implement in 
higher education—quality, access, and relevance. Yet, many educators have 
continually attacked the USE and worked to undermine the process. In an April 30, 
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2009 interview with the publication Russian Gazette’s Michael Barshevsky, Minister of 
Education and Science Andrei Fursenko explained that the USE is really a mirror simply 
showing the ills of the education system. He asserts that “We always blame the 
mirror!”  He believes that the country has to admit that, over time, teacher lost the art 
of teaching and pupils forgot how to learn. He suggests that instead of waging war 
against the USE, we all need to admit to the problem and devote energy to fixing the 
problem. In an interview with Kommersant on April 8, 2009, Fursenko explained how 
many split on the issue of the USE. He argues that many teachers and local officials 
oppose the USE because it estimates the efficiency of teachers and local officials and 
shows the rampant irresponsibility of a significant number of people in the education 
process.  Therefore, many oppose USE because it reveals a lack of teaching and 
learning. On the other hand, many pupils and their families welcome the USE.  The 
young pupils accept it because there is no risk: If they get a poor score it does not go 
on their certificate and they can retake it the next year. Families like it because they 
can save money as the USE eliminates the extra expense of paying for their children to 
travel and stay in another city for exams. I would add that perhaps the USE will help to 
level the playing field by giving greater access to higher education to a more diverse 
population of pupils through the country. 
 Another controversial initiative that generated criticism from rectors was the 
experiment with one of the new methods of funding for higher education, the 
personal state-backed education voucher.  This new funding scheme was designed to 
achieve two purposes. First, it would provide greater access to higher education by 
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making funds available to a broad range of young people. Second, it would channel 
additional money into the system of state-run HEIs.  Students would qualify for four 
categories of funding ranging from coverage of full cost to partial cost, depending on 
their scores on a standardized state test. The government gave the education ministry 
permission to experiment with the program for the 2003 and 2004 academic years. 
Critics of the plan expressed concern that the list of HEIs participating in the 
experiment was unclear and that the level of funding for the categories below full cost 
had not been determined. Many believed that the scheme would not bring in 
significant funding and would likely make the final situation worse. Officials at the 
education ministry countered critics arguing that the education voucher experiment 
“undermines the very foundation of preparatory courses, which bring HEIs substantial 
amounts of money, and it destroys the long-established practice of coaching for 
entrance exams . . . That’s why they are giving our idea a hostile reception.” 
 The over-arching goal of Putin’s initiatives is to develop a tiered system of 
higher education institutions in Russia. The top tier would consist of 10 to 20 leading 
national universities, essentially national research universities. The next tier would 
consist of 100 to 400 other universities offering bachelor and master’s degree 
programs. The next tier would consist of HEIs offering strictly bachelor level programs. 
Still being considered is a special category at the apex of the system for Moscow State 
University (MGU) and, perhaps, St. Petersburg State University (SPSU). MGU already 
has the distinction of being the only Russian HEI with its own separate line item in the 
federal budget.  
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In his April 8, 2009 interview with Kommersant, Minister Fursenko stated that 
he believes that about 1,000 HEIs, including their various branches is enough 
institutions for the system; however, the ministry had no strict administrative plans to 
close or reduce the more than 3,000 institutions. Rather, he argues that three 
mechanisms will surf ice to force out non-viable entities. The first of these is tougher 
requirements for university status. Second, the government is encouraging and 
supporting university consolidation in the regions.  The third mechanism results from 
the fluctuation in off-budget financing of higher education, i.e., paying students. As 
funds available for paying students shrink, there is the promise that only the higher 
quality, enterprising institutions will be able to attract and retain students, forcing 
others to go out of business. 
 In order to achieve that tiered system of HEIs Putin’s utilized the project 
approach. In September of 2005 Putin announced four priority national projects—
Education, Health, Affordable Housing, and Development of Agriculture. For Putin, all 
these areas are the most critical areas for two reasons. First, the four areas determine 
the quality of life and social well-being of society. Second, all four areas directly affect 
Russia’s demographic situation and create a starting point for development of human 
capital.  
Under the National Priority Project for education, the government supports 
innovative programs in HEIs on a competitive basis. The purpose of the project is to 
accelerate the modernization of HEIs, introduce new and sophisticated educational 
programs, integrate education and science, and to support new financial and 
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managerial mechanisms in HEIs. Institution may develop proposal for projects that will 
be implemented over two years and enter them in the competitions for grants ranging 
from 200 million to 1 billion rubles. Grants can be used to acquire laboratory 
equipment, to develop and acquire software and methodic data, to modernize physical 
infrastructure, and to raise qualifications and professional re-training of the scientific, 
instructional, and support personnel of HEIs.  
The success of the competitive structure of the innovation in higher education 
program led to the adoption of that model for a National Research University (NIU) 
program.  The aim of this program is to develop new institutional forms of organization 
of scientific and educational activities designed to respond to the human and scientific 
support requests in the high-tech sector of the Russian economy. Research universities 
are conceived as HEIs carrying out educational and research activities based on the 
principles of integration of science and education. Their most important distinguishing 
features include their ability to accomplish the following:  generate knowledge and to 
ensure effective transfer of technology to the economy; carry out a wide range of basic 
and applied research; operate a highly efficient system for training of masters and 
highly qualified personnel; and, develop retraining programs and continuing 
education. All research universities must be an integrated scientific and educational 
center, or include a number of such centers as a set of structural units, and conduct 
research on the overall scientific direction and training for certain high-tech sectors. 
The main purpose of state support for national research universities is the derivation 
of world-class educational institutions, capable of assuming responsibility for the 
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preservation and development of human resources of science, high technology and 
professional education, development and commercialization of high technologies of 
the Russian Federation.  
The federal government also supports the creation of new universities in 
Federal Districts. The first two were announced in 2007, one in the Southern Federal 
District and one in the Siberian Federal District.  Plans for five more were announced in 
2009 for the North (Artic), Kazan (Volga), Ural, Far East, and Northwest. The purpose of 
this initiative is two-fold. First, they want to develop leading national universities with 
strong linkages to the economy and the social sphere of the district. Second, they want 
to be able to utilize these new federal universities in organizing and coordinating 
major socio-economic development programs in the territories and region.    
Also, the government announced plans to create two world-class business 
schools—one in the St. Petersburg region and one in the Moscow region.  The business 
school initiative is designed to address the country’s serious deficit in competent 
managers, especially in the large and middle level firms, and to produce cadres of 
business leaders with the knowledge and experience to guide Russian enterprises 
through turbulent and uncertain global markets. The school at St. Petersburg is being 
developed at the elaborate palatial park Mikhailovskaya Dacha in Peterhof. Plans are 
to model it after Harvard, Stanford, and London, with strong linkages and exchanges 
with the same.  The Moscow school at Skolkovo is being developed as private-state 
partnership.  In addition to the government, Russian and foreign private investors and 
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companies constitute the initial partner-founders investing at least 5 million dollars 
each for the project. Estimates of initial private invest is $300 million. 
The project approach is consistent with Putin’s apparent preference for a 
practical approach to problem solving. While his administration acknowledges that 
there are many pressing problems, they assert that there is no need to set a lot of 
targets for a year. Indeed, that would be undesirable. Instead, they believe it is 
possible to choose three or four key objectives and try to realize those, fully. 
The Bologna Process 
 
 Bologna Process is an initiative of European states to establish the European 
Higher Education Area (EHEA), beginning in 1999. In their “Joint Declaration on 
Harmonization of the architecture of the European Higher Education System,” 
popularly known as The Sorbonne Joint Declaration, they called on European 
governments to commit to progressive harmonization of their programs, by means of 
joint diplomas, pilot initiatives and dialogue among the various stakeholders.  The 
governments of twenty nine European states answered that call when they signed the 
Bologna Declaration pledging to establish the EHEA and to promote the European 
higher education system.   In the original declaration, participating governments 
agreed to implement six objectives. States agreed to establish easily readable and 
comparable degrees. This would facilitate the recognition of each other’s degrees and 
training. Next, states agreed to adopt a system based on two main cycles—
undergraduate and postgraduate, primarily bachelor and master degree programs.  
Closely related, states agree to organize the academic year into semesters. A European 
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higher education system based on two-cycles and semester would allow for increased 
mobility, as well as joint degrees and programs.  Fourth, states agreed to establish a 
system of credits compatible with the European credit transfer system (ECTS). This is 
important for assessment and comparison of qualifications and requirements.  It is 
especially important in promoting student mobility because the risk losing credit is a 
major obstacle to mobility. Fifth, states agreed to establish quality assurance 
mechanisms in cooperation with a European quality assurance regime. And sixth, 
states agreed to promote the European dimension of higher education, i.e., joint 
degrees, curriculum development, inter-institutional cooperation, mobility schemes, 
and integrated programs of study, training and research.    
 Russia joined the Bologna Process at the Berlin Conference in 2003, committing 
itself to the implementation of the Bologna process and achieving the priority 
intermediate objectives for realizing the EHEA by 2010. However, Russia seems to have 
stalled in implementing the main intermediate objective—the two cycle system in 
higher education. The law adopting the two cycle system was passed and signed into 
law in 2007. In 2009, the Ministry of Education and Science reported that only nine 
percent of students in HEIs were enrolled in two cycle system programs, while ninety 
two percent of Russian students continued to study in the traditional specialist, five-
year programs. The Ministry reported good progress on the other two intermediate 
objectives. In 2009, Russia reported a functioning quality assurance system that had 
been reviewed against the Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the 
European Higher Education Area (ESG); however, the system had not been subjected 
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to an external review and students have not been included in most quality assurance 
procedures. Russia ratified the Lisbon Convention in 2000 and created a National 
Information Center on Academic Recognition and Mobility (NIC/ARM) by the order of 
the Minister of Education in accordance with Article 10 of the Lisbon Convention. 
Russia’s NIC/ARC has been actively cooperating with centers oversees on issues of 
recognition of documentation of education. It also maintains and publishes the list of 
accredited HEIs in Russia.  
At the present time, it appears that the Bologna objectives are only marginally 
relevant to the current higher education agenda in Russia. Prerequisite to the Bologna 
goals, I would argue, is substantial progress in realizing the priorities in the current 
Russian agenda, i.e., modernization Russian higher education program to make it more 
relevant, to rehabilitate and reconstruct the material and resource base of the 
profession, and to redevelop the physical infrastructures of HEIs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V 
 
RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
 
 The Levada Center, the independent polling and sociological research 
organization established in 1987, conducts ongoing research on problems of education 
in Russia and publishes reports of their studies in the journal Monitoring Public Opinion 
and other publications.  Analysts at the Center conclude that “the former, Soviet state 
distributive, departmental, hierarchical structures for the training of specialists, for the 
job placement of graduates and their perquisites and advancement, were not good 
enough under contemporary conditions or in the framework of a postindustrial open 
society (Dubin and Zorkaia 2010, 16).”   They acknowledge that there was much 
excitement about the prospects for reform and change in the early years of post-Soviet 
society, but that much of the culture of the Soviet system survived. They argue that  
 
. . . the rigid bureaucratic model of higher education of the Soviet type 
managed to emerge from the crisis that was due to the shrinking of state 
financing in the mid-1990s without any serious, systemic or long-term changes 
taking place . . . the corporation retained its structure and the state’s monopoly 
(over the kinds of activities to develop higher education) but it shifted the 
burden of the costs of its own maintenance onto the groups of the population 
for whom a higher education is a value and a goal (Dubin and Zorkaia, 17).  
  
What do ordinary Russians think about Russian education, higher education in 
particular? Most recently the Levada Center studied the perceptions and assessments 
of Russian higher education by various social, demographic, and sociocultural groups 
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of Russians in a representative survey of urban population conducted in April and May 
of 2009. The survey was carried out on the basis of three samples. The first sample—
1500 people—represent the urban adult population between the ages of fifteen and 
fifty nine. The second sample—350 people—represents Russia’s urban youth ages 
fifteen and twenty nine. And the third group—150 people—represents  the highly 
educated defined, roughly, as those with a second higher education degree or are in 
the process of completing a second university degree. The respondents in the samples 
came from 119 cities of at least 100,000 in population. The survey was conducted on 
the basis of a uniform formalized questionnaire carried out using the personal 
interview method in the respondents’ homes.    
The 2009 survey revealed that the overwhelming majority of the urban 
population and 89% of the youth population believe that higher education was 
essential for young people. The top three motives for pursuing higher education were 
expressed as follows: without higher education one will not be able to find a job that 
pays well; without higher education one will not be able to make a career; without 
higher education one will not be able to become a specialist in one chosen field of 
professional activity.  Levada analysts stress the extremely high importance attached 
to money in the opinions and assessments higher education by most groups of 
Russians. The results of a 2003 survey (N=1300) contrast significantly with the 2009 
results. In 2003, most young Russians were willing to accept a combination of a free 
and tuition-based education.  At that time, sixty one percent of the young people 
surveyed were attending a HEI on a tuition-free basis, while thirty six percent were 
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paying for their education. Six years later, more young Russians were insisting on free 
education, with forty eight percent attending an HEI on a tuition-free basis and fifty 
one percent paying for their education.   Also, both the 2003 and 2009 surveys reveal 
apparent ambivalence about higher education. If eighty seven percent of the 
population believes higher education is essential, fifty three percent of the 
respondents in 2003 and forty five percent of those in 2009 say that an education 
below higher education levels is sufficient for people like themselves.   
According to the survey of young Russians, the vast majority of those who were 
enrolled in higher education or who had finished their studies at an HEI were satisfied 
with their chosen institution. Fifty one percent were completely satisfied, while 42 
percent were satisfied with certain things and dissatisfied with others. Only four 
percent were completely dissatisfied with their chosen institution. The reasons for 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction are informative (respondents could list more than one 
thing).  The main reasons for satisfaction cited most frequently by the respondents 
were the overall quality of instruction (47%), getting a good diploma leading, 
hopefully, to a good job (34%), the high professionalism of instructors (31%),and 
interesting courses and seminars (19%).  Reasons for dissatisfaction centered on 
student perceptions of their inability to influence the process of their own learning, 
the array of special courses and seminars of interest to them and compulsory 
attendance of the required array of courses, and lack of opportunity to improve the 
quality of their education experience. Some also cited dissatisfaction with their small 
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or nonexistent stipend.   In thinking about student satisfaction and dissatisfaction, 
however, analysts cautioned the reader about a serious discrepancy.  They assert 
 
It turns out that although they are in general highly satisfied with the prestige, 
equipment, and facilities of their institution, and with the knowledge that they 
are acquiring and the instructors who provide this knowledge, the students are 
rather poorly prepared to engage in practical activity after they have 
completed their studies; they did not have much of an opportunity to engage in 
professional practice, and they do not have much confidence that they can 
count on getting a good job. In other words, we again encounter the serious 
discrepancy between school and real life (Dubin and Zorkaia, 50).  
 
Regarding the assessment of higher education, survey results indicate that the 
population at large as well a young Russians as a whole rate the quality of the 
professional training of students in Russian HEIs as primarily average. When it comes 
to the question of the quality of instruction, respondents give high marks to colleges 
and universities in the West while at the same time they make very general declarative 
and compulsory assessments of the overall superiority of education in Russia. The 
authors of the study point out, however, that although most Russians do not give high 
marks for quality of instructions, “the overwhelming majority of the respondents in all 
of the subsamples say that the quality of the teaching in the HEIs of the capital city 
(Moscow and perhaps St. Petersburg and other large urban centers) is higher or 
considerably higher than it is in the regions (Dubin and Zorkaia, 52).”   
 From the perspective of most respondents in the study, the present system of 
higher education in Russia is no match for Western educational standards.  Study 
analysts assert that “what is most important is that the system of higher education in 
Russia is weaker than in the West when it comes to the training of specialists in the 
39 
 
professions that Russians consider to be the best ones for young people and offer the 
greatest promise of making good money.”  Consequently, for sixty seven percent of 
the adult population and sixty nine percent of young Russians, “the most serious 
problem confronting higher education, one that needs to be solved in the next few 
years, is the high cost of the tuition (Dubin and Zorkaia, 54-57, 60-61).”   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI 
 
CONCLUSIONS
 
 
 After nearly twenty years of post-Soviet Russia reforms, higher education is still 
burdened with a plethora of problems. However, despite the difficulties attendant 
with the transition, in my view, Russia is making significant progress in modernizing 
HEIs and developing a tiered system of diverse institution. Although the model of 
higher education being implemented was largely conceived by the central government 
in a manner similar to the top-down approach to reform of the past, there appears to 
be increasing societal support for the plan. Although it is too early to measure the 
impact of priority projects, more and more HEIs are developing projects and 
competing for grant funds. What is more, OECD reviewers conclude that   “Russian 
tertiary education is actively developing today, in line with international trends and the 
policy priorities in tertiary education aimed at enhancing equity, quality and 
effectiveness of tertiary education (OECD 2007, 34). 
 As state above, the Yeltsin years represent a laissez faire period when, by 
default, the government loosened the reins on higher education. I say by default as I 
would argue that leaders had no real alternative but to allow more autonomy. The 
state was preoccupied with the gargantuan task of transition and state coffers were 
practically empty. The result was a dearth of funds and the absence of a coherent 
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program for developing higher education. Despite this unfavorable environment, some 
progress was made. Perhaps the most significant example was the change in the 
formal legal basis of higher education. The 1992 draft law and the 1996 law on 
education, along with various presidential decrees provided a new framework for 
reorganizing and developing a higher education system with more decentralized 
control and greater institutional autonomy. 
 The Putin years introduced more central direction and control of HEI activities 
in the reform process. Putin interjected his vision of developing a tiered system of 
select HEIs with diverse missions and capabilities as the basis for modernizing higher 
education in Russia. Ironically, Putin adopted an implementation approach reminiscent 
of Soviet five-year plans. He instituted his own version of the five-plan with a series of 
projects and program designed to structure HEI activities in the directions of the new 
system. Several key program documents regulate higher education activities and 
constitute the framework for Putin project. The Conception for Modernization of the 
Russian Education system until 2010, established in 2002, formulates the priorities for 
education policy, of which the most important are ensuring equity, creating the 
conditions for the quality assurance, and improving economic management of the HEI 
system. On Priority Directions for Development of the Education System of Russian 
Federation was established in 2005. It supports activities to develop a modern system 
of lifelong professional education, quality assurance, access to high-quality secondary 
education, and improvement of the investment climate in the education sector. The 
National Project for “Education” plays a key role in stimulating innovations in 
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education. Under this Project, the content of higher education is to be modernized in 
accordance with national needs and global trends. Also, the status, welfare and 
qualifications of employees in higher education are to be improved.  
 Thus far, Putin’s approach to higher education reform is highly structured but it 
has not presented itself as unreasonably rigid. I would argue that barring any national 
crises or wars, Russia will continue to design and implement plans with a limited 
number of specific objectives, and the Russian public and higher education community 
will continue to acquiesce in those plans. 
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